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We introduce a computational model of the negative priming (NP) effect that includes
perception, memory, attention, decision making, and action. The model is designed to
provide a coherent picture across competing theories of NP . The model is formulated in
terms of abstract dynamics for the activations of features, their binding into object entities,
their semantic categorization as well as related memories and appropriate reactions.The
dynamic variables interact in a connectionist network which is shown to be adaptable to
a variety of experimental paradigms. We ﬁnd that selective attention can be modeled by
means of inhibitory processes and by a threshold dynamics. From the necessity of quan-
tifying the experimental paradigms, we conclude that the speciﬁcity of the experimental
paradigm must be taken into account when predicting the nature of the NP effect.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Selectiveattentionenablesgoal-directedbehaviordespitethelarge
amount of ongoing input to the sensory system. This ability is
strongly linked to the problem of how information is ignored.
Contradicting an earlier understanding that active attention to
some objects requires passively ignoring others,an experiment by
Dalrymple-AlfordandBudayr(1966)revealed,inaseriesofStroop
tasks an active nature of the suppression of irrelevant stimuli.
WhiletheoriginalStroop(orJaensch)testdidnotuseasystematic
repetition of color and color words, here the stimulus cards were
designed such that the ignored meaning of a color word became
the color of the next word shown. This led to slower responses
as compared to unrelated stimulus colors. Even if the semantic
meaning of the words had been ignored, it must have entered the
cognitive system to produce the characteristic interference.
Since then, several standard negative priming (NP) paradigms
have emerged featuring various dimensions in which priming can
occur, e.g., the identity of stimulus objects (Fox, 1995) or their
locationonthedisplay(Millikenetal.,1994).Thestimulussethas
alsobeenvaried,e.g.,pictures(TipperandCranston,1985),shapes
(DeSchepper and Treisman, 1996), words (Grison and Strayer,
2001), letters (Frings and Wühr, 2007), sounds (Mayr and Buch-
ner, 2007), or colored dots (Neill, 1977). All paradigms have in
common, stimuli containing targets that are to be attended and
distractorsthataretobeignored.Experimentalconditionsdepend
onStimulusrepetitions,particularlytheroleofarepeatedobjectas
target or distractor in two successive trials.Variations of this basic
setting include the manipulation of experimental parameters like
thetimebetweentworelatedtrials,thenumberof distractors,and
thesaliencyof thedistractor.Thesometimescontradictoryresults
of such variations will be considered in more detail in Section 2.3.
Because of the controversial nature of the NP effect, a variety of
interpretations have been developed, but so far none of the theo-
ries is able to explain all aspects of the effect. Various underlying
mechanisms have been proposed to act at different stages of the
processing of the stimuli each justiﬁed by a certain experimental
result. The theories also diverge with respect to the basis of the
effect, i.e., whether it is a memory phenomenon or an effect of
attention. They all agree,however,on the critical role of temporal
processing for an understanding of NP.
We are particularly interested in the neurophysiological mech-
anisms behind attention and ignoring of perceptual information.
Attention is, in principle, a form of guidance of neural activ-
ity toward relevant resources. If ignoring of stimuli or stimulus
features is an active process, then those resources are subject to
suppressive effects of some kind. In principle, these could be
maintainedbyvariousprocesses,e.g.,elevatedthresholds,synaptic
depression,orcompetitioninvolvinghomeostaticplasticity.How-
ever,consideringthatattentionisessentiallyguidedbyprocessesin
the prefrontal cortex and the fact that prefrontal feedback is typi-
callygivenbyinhibitorysignals(Knightetal.,1999),itseemslikely
that inhibition plays a key role in the effects of selective attention.
In the model presented here, inhibition serves multiple func-
tions: it not only underlies attention by suppressing irrelevant
stimulus components, but is essential in the formation of bound
states that represent objects as synchronized set of feature-related
activity and is assumed to underlie the selection of action. Corre-
sponding to the multiple uses, inhibition occurs in several forms.
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Atthesensorylevel,inhibitionismerelyarelativeadvantageofone
oftheperceivedfeaturesthatisinitiatedbytop-downinput.Inthis
case, the model is ignorant to the particular form of suppression,
which can be implemented in different but mathematically equiv-
alent forms,e.g.,as an adaptive threshold. This indifference is due
to the generality of our approach and allows us to express several
conﬂicting theories from the psychological literature by the same
formal model component.
In the feature binding component of our model inhibition
occurs in a uniquely deﬁned form: object-encoding activations in
thebindinglayerarestabilizedbylateralinhibition.Althoughhere
also alternatives are mathematically possible, there is no psycho-
logicalorneurophysiologicalevidenceforaﬁne-tunedmechanism
as proposed by Schrobsdorff et al. (2007a). Finally, inhibition is
realized in a more schematic form in action selection which we
have included in the model in a form analogous to the perceptual
or frontal modules rather than as a realistic representation of the
motor system.
A further main contribution of the present study is a single
and comprehensive computational model, combining the differ-
ent theories such that it is able to express the behavior predicted
by each of the NP theories1. To deal with apparent inconsistencies
and incompatibilities across the theories, we employ two strate-
gies. First, we choose a dynamical formulation, whose natural
mathematical form, allows us to identify similarities that are not
obvious from the theoretical conclusions of speciﬁc experiments,
and whose structure can be directly related to physiological evi-
dence of cognition. Second, we will use a set of conﬁguration
parameters that function as weights or semaphores and can scale-
downorswitch-off acomponentthatisnotpostulatedinacertain
theoretical context. In other words, all the model components
can work together but often such preselected subsets of com-
ponents are sufﬁcient to describe a given empirically developed
theory. It is crucial to remark that the different roles of inhi-
bition are always present in the variants of the model that are
implied by the literature, except for the retrieval module which
is not discussed in some accounts. Also generally, the choice of
theconﬁgurationisunambiguouslyspeciﬁedbythepsychological
account in all major theories of NP. In the present formulation of
the general model for negative priming (GMNP) there are seven
optional components, but extensions are easily possible, should
newer experimental evidence imply additional contributions to
the NP effect.
We will describe in detail how a computational model can be
constructed along these lines that comprises all potentially rele-
vant processing stages for an NP task. The result is not only a
comprehensive model of the theories of NP, but more generally,
a framework for perception-based action in natural or artiﬁcial
cognitive systems. The system is explicit in the sense that the
components are mathematically deﬁned. The system is also con-
nectionist, i.e., the interaction between the components represent
the task (see Figure 3) which is realized either by design or in
the wider context by a learning process. Finally, the system is
1The source code containing several paradigm examples is available through the
project web site http://www.bccn-goettingen.de/projects/gmnp
dynamic, i.e., the activity levels of all components change in time
andexcite,inhibitormodulateeachother.Thisreﬂectstheimpor-
tance of the time course in NP as well as in general behavioral
contexts.
Thepaperisorganizedinthefollowingway.Wewillﬁrstclarify
terminology, deepen the discussion on how to concretize psy-
chological theories, present the NP effect, give an overview on
the biological background of the model units and ﬁnally explain
how these enter into the proposed GMNP. The second section
thoroughly reviews existing theories of NP. Speciﬁcally, we give
a historical overview of the development of theories and what
additional conclusions were drawn in experimental papers. The
quantiﬁcation of theories and how they are integrated in the
framework of the GMNP is followed by a technical chapter that
describes the implementation of the model in a way allowing
researchers to reproduce the simulations. Finally the behavior of
the GMNP in various NP paradigms is shown. The concluding
discussionsummarizestheseresultsandconsidersthepotentialof
the model beyond the described target application in NP.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
We present an integrative connectionist model of NP. For a thor-
ough description of the model and the necessity of its parts, this
section is organized as follows. After deﬁning basic experimental
nomenclature we very brieﬂy present a generic NP experiment to
introduce the viewpoint of NP research. Next, we summarize the
various and diverse modulations of NP when faced with a wide
range of experimental variations, thereby showing the sensitivity
of thephenomenonandthustherequirementof arathercomplex
model.Then,wereviewanumberoftheoreticalaccountsthatwere
postulated to explain a certain aspect of NP. Those theories will
be incorporated in our model. After an overview of the GMNP,
wedescribetheroleof theindividualmodelcomponentsindetail,
and ﬁnally, the rigorous mathematical formulation of the GMNP
is presented.
2.1. DEFINITIONS
In the present study we will use the following deﬁnition: NP is
a slowdown in reaction time in a repetition condition where a
former distractor has become target. Because we deﬁne the term
NP by reaction time differences, we shall not use it to denote the
ignored repetition condition. Instead we will label the condition
bytwo(orfour)lettersthatindicatetheconﬁgurationof stimuliin
a trial consisting of a prime and a probe display (see Christie and
Klein,2001). Generally,the ﬁrst letter contains information about
which part of the prime display is repeated in the probe display:
the letter D represents the distractor,while T represents the target.
The second letter indicates the role the particular object has in the
probedisplay.Forexample,thestringDTreferstotheconditionin
which the prime distractor (ﬁrst letter D) is repeated in the probe
trial as a target (second letter T), which denotes the traditional
NP condition. If no stimulus is repeated,the condition is denoted
by CO. In case both objects are repeated there is a second pair of
letters appended for the second object. Because a target and a dis-
tractor are each shown in the prime and the probe display, seven
relevant combinations of target-distractor relations are possible,
see Table 1.
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2.2. A NEGATIVE PRIMING EXPERIMENT
WewillnowverybrieﬂydiscussaprototypeNPexperimentthatwe
will refer to in the following discussion. The experiment has been
adapted from the classic study by Tipper (1985) and is presented
in detail in Schrobsdorff et al. (2007b). Subjects are instructed
to name the green pictogram as quickly and accurately as possi-
ble (see Figure 1). Stimuli are six different objects, represented
by hand-drawn pictograms that are either shown in green or in
red. We use voice recording together with a sound level threshold
to determine the reaction time for every trial. As the experi-
ment is run in German, possible responses are German names
of simple objects that begin with a plosive and consist of a sin-
gle syllable: Baum (tree), Bus (bus), Ball (ball), Buch (book), Bett
(bed), and Bank (bench), for a sharp, and thus easily detectable
onset of the sound signal. For efﬁciency reasons, we present the
trials continuously, such that every trial primes the subject for
the following trial (see Ihrke and Behrendt, 2011, for a discus-
sion of the implications of this procedure). Object presentation
is balanced in the different priming conditions as well as in
their appearance as target and distractor. Implemented priming
conditions include CO, DT, TT, DDTT, and DTTD, see Table 1
and Figure 1.
A stimulus display consists of two overlapping line drawings,a
green target, and a red distractor object. The subject is instructed
to name the target objects aloud and ignore the superimposed red
objects. They were told to answer as quickly and as accurately as
possible. Then, after a blank screen period and the presentation
of a ﬁxation cross, the next display is presented. Mean reaction
timesof thedifferentprimingconditions,thestandarddeviations,
and the effect strengths,i.e.,the difference to CO trials,are shown
in Table 2. For details, see Schrobsdorff (2009). DTTD trials pro-
ducetheslowestresponses,followedbyDTandCOtrials,whereas
the responses to TT trials are faster than control and DDTT trials
produce the fastest responses.
The experiment shows how the repetition of stimuli can inﬂu-
ence reaction times in a NP paradigm. A repetition of relevant
stimuli leads to prominent speedups (TT, DDTT conditions),
whereasapresentationofformerlyirrelevantstimuliasthecurrent
targetresultsinslowedreactiontimes(DTandDTTDconditions)
as compared to the control condition.
Table 1 |The priming conditions of a paradigm with one target and one distractor in each of the prime and probe display.
Prime display Probe display
Target Distractor Target Distractor
TT A B A C Target(nC1)Dtarget(n)
DT A B B C Target(nC1)Ddistractor(n)
TD A B C A Distractor(nC1)Dtarget(n)
DD A B C B Distractor(nC1)Ddistractor(n)
DDTT A B A B Target and distractor are repeated
DTTD A B B A Target and distractor are swapped
CO A B C D Two new stimuli
DT
time
time
DTTD
CO
reaction time
reaction
response stimulus interval
DDTT TT
CO
stimulus onset
CO
FIGURE 1 | Example of a sequence of stimuli. Consecutive screens are shown. Either stimuli or a blank screen followed by a ﬁxation cross is displayed.
Acronyms are explained inTable 1.
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2.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEGATIVE PRIMING EFFECT
Negative priming has been found in a wide variety of exper-
imental contexts (for reviews, see Fox, 1995; May et al., 1995;
Tipper,2001;MayrandBuchner,2007).Forexample,NPhasbeen
elicited using different stimuli such as line drawings (Tipper and
Cranston,1985),letters (Neill andValdes,1992; Neill et al.,1992),
words (Grison and Strayer, 2001), auditory stimuli (Banks et al.,
1995; Buchner and Steffens, 2001; Mayr and Buchner, 2006), and
nonsense shapes (DeSchepper and Treisman, 1996). NP has been
found in various tasks including naming (Tipper, 1985), same-
different matching (DeSchepper and Treisman,1996),Stroop-like
tasks (Neill, 1977), and spatial localization (Milliken et al., 1994;
Park and Kanwisher, 1994; May et al., 1995; Kabisch, 2003), see
Figure 2 for four example paradigms.
The NP effect is sensitive to a large number of parameters.
Most paradigms show a particular aspect of NP, but no global
pattern of results exists (Fox, 1995). It has been shown that NP
can depend on the length of the response stimulus interval (RSI)
between prime and probe (Neill et al.,1992; Kabisch,2003; Frings
and Eder, 2009). However, there are also studies reporting a con-
stant NP effect for varied RSIs (Hasher et al., 1991, 1996; Tipper
et al., 1991). Surprisingly, for very short RSIs, a DT condition can
produce a facilitatory (Lowe, 1985), or hampering effect (Frings
and Wühr, 2007). At the other extreme, an experiment revealed
NPafteramonthusingnonsenseshapeswhichareveryunlikelyto
be seen in other circumstances (DeSchepper and Treisman,1996).
For continuous presentation of trials,the proportion of preprime
RSI and current RSI inﬂuences NP (Neill and Valdes, 1992; Mayr
and Buchner,2006),but not reliably (Hasher et al.,1996;Conway,
Table 2 | Reaction times, standard deviation, and priming effects, i.e.,
the differences of control (CO) reaction time and reaction time of the
according condition (DT, DTTD,TT,TDDT).
hRTi (ms) (SD) Effect (ms)
CO 660.22 (62.85) –
DT 681.57 (69.65)  21.36
DTTD 685.92 (78.04)  25.70
TT 625.02 (65.29) 35.20
DDTT 600.69 (70.56) 59.53
1999). In the absence of distractors in the probe trial during a
DTcondition,NPvanishesorevenreversestofacilitation(Allport
etal.,1985;Lowe,1985;TipperandCranston,1985;Moore,1994).
Amoresalientprimedistractorincreasesthemagnitudeof theNP
effect in DT conditions (Grison and Strayer, 2001; Tipper, 2001).
NP is reduced or even reversed to facilitation when the emphasis
is put on speed rather than accuracy (Neumann and Deschepper,
1992). Increasing the perceptual load, e.g., by raising the number
of distractors presented in a single trial, leads to less NP (Lavie
et al., 2004). In other settings a higher number of prime distrac-
tors causes an increase of NP (Neumann and Deschepper, 1992;
Fox, 1995). The inclusion of TT trials or single target trials in the
presentation sequence enhances NP (Neill and Westberry, 1987;
Titz et al., 2008). A short presentation time of prime and probe
stimuli attenuates NP (Gibbons and Rammsayer, 2004). NP van-
ishesif thetargetispresentedabitearlierthanthedistractorinthe
prime trial. On the other hand, if the prime distractor is shown
simultaneously with the prime target but blanked after a short
time,NP is observed (Moore,1994). If the prime display contains
a single stimulus that is masked, subjects reporting awareness of
the prime object show positive priming, while subjects not aware
of the object show a NP effect (Wentura and Frings, 2005). In
subliminallyprimedtrialsthepresenceof adistractorintheprobe
leadstonegativepriming,whereastheabsenceofaprobedistractor
leads to a positive priming effect (Neill and Kahan, 1999).
2.4. THEORIES OF NEGATIVE PRIMING
Because of the sensitivity of the NP effect to numerous factors,
a variety of theories have been proposed to explain the disparate
experimental facts. None of the present theoretical descriptions,
however, explains all observation related to the NP effect, cf.
Section 2.3. In the present section we will give an overview on
the most relevant approaches.
2.4.1. Distractor inhibition theory
In the ﬁrst attempt to explain NP,the inhibition hypothesis (Neill,
1977; Neill et al., 1990) inhibition plays a central role. Later, this
hypothesis branched into distractor inhibition theory (Tipper,
1985, 2001; Tipper and Baylis, 1987; Tipper et al., 1988, 1991,
2002; Tipper and McLaren, 1990; Houghton and Tipper, 1994,
1996), and episodic-retrieval theory (Neill and Valdes, 1992, see
Section 2.4.2).
A B
D DC
A D
B C
C
"Ball"
D
match mismatch
BALL
FIGURE 2 | Four different paradigms for NP . (A)The location priming
paradigm reveals NP in the encoding of space. (B)The ﬂanker task implements
a stimulus response mapping. (C) Responses are given as vocalization in the
voicekey paradigm. (D)The word-picture comparison paradigm has the
advantage of a disentanglement of target identity and response.The examples
have been adapted such that green always deﬁnes the target.
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FIGURE 3 | Interaction scheme of the different components of the
GMNP . Perceived stimuli are decomposed into single features, each of
which is represented in a single variable in the corresponding layer. Object
identity is maintained by activations in the binding layer, associating the
different features of a stimulus object. Most paradigms require a semantic
evaluation of the stimuli in order to generate a response.Therefore, the
semantic layer gates information ﬂow from the relevant features to the
action layer which decides on the action to perform. Parallel to the
information ﬂow from perception to action a so-called central executive
steers the model behavior with regard to the current task, i.e., providing
information about the target and the mapping of semantic variables to
actions. According to the similarity of the percept and a memorized
stimulus conﬁguration, the memory layer feeds back information of the
former trial.The similarity signal also affects the effectiveness of
transmission between features, semantic layer and actions as well as
between memory itself and actions, the latter inversely to the ﬁrst.
In the distractor inhibition theory,inhibition is complemented
by an attentional selection process, i.e., the direct feed-forward
excitation induced by the (visually) perceived stimuli. The slow-
down of the reaction in the probe trial can be understood as
a direct indicator of the amount of distractor activation in the
prime display. Persisting inhibition is assumed to drive the dis-
tractor representation below a baseline activation after stimulus
offset. Selection is said to operate on a semantic or postcategorial
level(HoughtonandTipper,1994).Itthereforealsoexplainsﬁnd-
ings that report NP in semantic priming tasks (Tipper and Driver,
1988).
The NP effect increases with growing saliency of the distrac-
tor (Lavie and Fox, 2000; Grison and Strayer, 2001; Tipper et al.,
2002). This effect can be very well explained in terms of the
inhibition model, since a stronger distractor would require more
inhibition,causingastrongerinhibitoryrebound,andthusleading
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to a more prolonged reaction time. Distractor inhibition theory
can explain the larger NP effect by a stronger activation and thus
more inhibition for distractors (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Craik,
2002). Therefore, more deeply processed stimuli produce larger
NP effects.
Opposingly, distractor inhibition theory fails to explain the
experimentally observed dependency of NP on the RSI: if the
representation of a distractor object is inhibited, the impact of
inhibition should be strongest immediately after the selection,
because the inhibition is assumed to decay with time. Although
thereisageneraltrendofNPtodecaywithincreasingtimebetween
prime and probe (Neill and Valdes, 1992), no NP is observed in
several studies when the RSI is very short or non-existent (Lowe,
1985; Houghton et al., 1996).
2.4.2. Episodic-retrieval theory
ProposedbyNeillandValdes(1992),episodic-retrievaltheorysup-
poses that if a task is executed over and over again, memories of
past trials are more and more used in the current trial. NP is
then assumed to be the result of automatic retrieval of the prime
episode during probe processing causing a hampering interfer-
ence. It is argued that the retrieval is triggered by the similarity of
prime and probe episodes. As the information from the retrieved
episode in a DT trial is inconsistent with the current role of the
repeatedobjectasatarget,retrievedandperceivedinformationare
in conﬂict. Resolving the conﬂict is time consuming and results in
the slowdown of the reaction time.
According to later extensions by Neill (1997), the main deter-
minants of the strength of retrieval are the recency of the memory
traceandthestrengthof thememoryrepresentationof theformer
trial. Recency as a relevant factor receives empirical support from
studiesthatshowanegativecorrelationbetweenRSIandNPeffect
(Neill andValdes, 1992).
A facilitated response at very short RSIs (Lowe, 1985) is dif-
ﬁcult to explain in terms of the episodic-retrieval framework.
Another weakness of this approach is the empirically found effect
ofsemanticNP(e.g.,Waszaketal.,2005):theabsenceofperceptual
similarityshouldpreventanyretrievaltooccurthuspredictingthe
absence of any priming effects.
2.4.3. Response-retrieval theory
A relatively recent version of the episodic-retrieval theory focuses
on the encoding and retrieval of processing operations that
have been carried out during trial processing – in particular the
response (Rothermund et al., 2005). The theory builds on results
from the research on event-ﬁles (Hommel, 1998, 2004, 2005),
whichinvestigatestheencodingandretrievalof perception-action
bindings. Since the retrieved response conﬂicts with the response
required by the task in DT trials when a naming task is imple-
mented, NP is explained as an interference between the retrieved
and the currently required response. One particular merit of this
response-retrieval theory is therefore that it points to the inherent
confounding of the priming condition and the response relation
in most NP paradigms: usually DT trials are accompanied by a
response switch,whereas TT trials require the same response. The
response-retrieval approach postulates that every reaction time
difference in priming paradigms is explained by the retrieval of
a past response depending on the perceptual similarity between
the two displays. In their initial study, a letter-matching task ini-
tially developed by Neill et al. (1990) was adapted in order to
orthogonally vary repetition or non-repetition of the response
and priming conditions (Rothermund et al., 2005). Since the
propositionof response-retrievaltheory,manystudieshavefound
empiricalsupportforit(e.g.,MayrandBuchner,2006;Ihrkeetal.,
2011).
2.4.4. Temporal discrimination theory
Temporal discrimination assumes a classiﬁcation of stimuli as old,
where a response can be retrieved from memory, or new, where a
response has to be generated from scratch (Milliken et al., 1998).
The classiﬁcation consumes time depending non-monotonically
onthesimilaritybetweenthecurrentstimulusandamemorytrace:
the classiﬁcation as new is fast when prime and probe stimuli are
verydissimilar.Theclassiﬁcationasold isfastwhenthedisplaysare
identical. Intermediate similarities, however, such as in DT trials
where the prime distractor is repeated but not in the same color,
thedecisionwhetherthedisplayisold ornew takeslonger(seealso
NeillandKahan,1999;HealyandBurt,2003).Hence,bothNPand
positive priming effects can be explained with this mechanism.
Temporal discrimination and episodic-retrieval theories are
quite similar in structure. Most criticism toward temporal dis-
crimination relies on the equivalence of processing time after the
old/new-classiﬁcation. Temporal discrimination tacitly assumes
that the direct computation of a response is completely different
from a retrieval of the answer from memory. Thus no statement
exists that these processes take an equal amount of time. Another
weak point of temporal discrimination theory is the assumption
that classiﬁcation and retrieval or direct generation of a response
is processed serially. Most processes in the brain work in parallel,
and therefore a simultaneous computation (at least partly) of the
old/new signal together with a directly computed answer and the
retrieval of past episodes is more plausible.
2.4.5. Dual mechanism theory
Sincethereisevidenceinsupportof bothinhibitoryandepisodic-
retrievalprocesses,severalauthorshaveproposedthatbothmech-
anismsshouldbeactive.Thisnotionhasbeentermeddualmecha-
nismtheory.Originally,Mayetal.(1995)proposedthatinhibition
aswellasmemoryretrievalcanbethesourceof NPandtheexper-
imentalcontextspeciﬁeswhichof thetwomechanismsisexpected
to operate. Tipper (2001) argued that it is important to note that
distractorinhibitionandepisodic-retrievaltheoriesarenotmutu-
ally exclusive, and both inhibitory and retrieval processes could
be involved in the emergence of NP. Although retrieval processes
can be responsible for producing NP effects, inhibitory processes
are still required in selecting information for goal-directed behav-
ior. In most tasks, NP will supposedly be caused by a mixture of
contributions from persisting inhibition and interference from
retrieval. Because these processes may sometimes oppose each
other, it is difﬁcult to distinguish them by means of behavioral
measures like reaction times and error rates (Gibbons, 2006).
However, depending on the context and other experimental fac-
tors,the contributions of inhibitory and retrieval processes might
vary considerably (Kane et al., 1997; Tipper, 2001). Nevertheless,
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Gamboz et al. (2002) revealed in a meta-analysis that there is no
signiﬁcant evidence for a paradigm to produce patterns of results
favoring either inhibition or retrieval theories, pointing to simul-
taneous presence of inhibition and retrieval. Such a conclusion
supports the general framework adopted in the GMNP,presented
in this paper.
2.4.6. Global threshold theory
Kabisch (2003) developed the imago-semantic action model
(ISAM) with the hypothesis of a threshold variable whose value
decides to which items the system will respond from perceptual
input. The threshold adapts according to the current average acti-
vation of representations of objects. Additionally, a forced decay
of activation is assumed in the model if residual activity is partly
overwritten by perceptual input of a new stimulus. The ISAM
can account for positive as well as NP as shown by computer
simulations (Schrobsdorff et al., 2007b). It differs from distractor
inhibition theory (Section 2.4.1) by postulating only facilitative
input and passive decay in the absence of input.
The ISAM gives a comprehensive account of action selection.
The presented objects are assumed to undergo pre-attentive pro-
cessing and a perception stage, resulting in an abstract cognitive
representationoftheobjects.Formally,thedecisionbetweentarget
anddistractorisdeterminedbythetaskinstruction,whichismade
accessibletothemodelviaasemanticfeedbackloop.Incontrastto
theearlyvisualprocesses,thedecisionisguidedbyattentionanda
conscious application of the task instruction. The semantic object
representationsareassumedtobeinitiallyprocessedautomatically
according to a relevance rating based on low-level features such as
motionorcolor.If morethanoneornooptionforsuprathreshold
actions exist, the threshold adapts until only one option remains.
The relative relevance of stimuli can be affected in a posterior rat-
ing.Accordingtothedual-codehypothesisof Krauseetal.(1997),
assigning modiﬁed relevance values to the object representation
happens in a semantic space. The activation corresponding to a
target is further ampliﬁed by a top-down feedback loop informed
ofthetask,suchthateveniflow-levelperceptualfeaturesresultina
higher input to the distractor,the target representation eventually
becomes signiﬁcantly stronger than that of the distractor.
2.5. A GENERAL MODEL FOR NEGATIVE PRIMING
The existing theories of NP have pointed to several mechanisms
that are likely to play a role in producing NP. However, it is very
important to keep in mind that fundamental research in psychol-
ogy uses statistical properties of experimental data in order to
interpret human behavior. On the one hand, behavioral experi-
ments tend to produce largely varying results which reﬂect the
complexityof theinvolvedsystemsandthesensitivityof theeffect.
On the other hand, the interpretation of results is usually not
unambiguous. Both aspects provide a base for the arduous and
controversial discourse that is necessary for a clariﬁcation of the
psychological phenomenon.
2.5.1. Computational modeling of negative priming
Theories explaining NP can be categorized roughly into memory-
based and activation-based approaches. The ﬁrst group assumes
the memorization of a trial and eventually a retrieval of the infor-
mationinthenexttrial.ThelattergroupassumesNPtobecaused
by interference of trial processing with persistent activation from
former trials. Within both groups a number of variants were pro-
duced,many of which were created to explain a speciﬁc pattern of
results.Comparabilityisneverthelessanissuethatcallsforamore
comprehensive approach.
It seems reasonable to focus on the interaction of underlying
processes rather than on ad hoc deﬁnition of data features. How-
ever, a substantial reduction of complexity is already achieved
by the careful design of experiments and all theoretical expla-
nations are based on the assumption that the complexity of
experimental data can be further reduced by identifying repeat-
ing patterns in the data. A crucial point in the speciﬁcation of
mechanisms producing NP seems to be the exact time course of
processing in a trial where a previously ignored stimulus has to
be attended in comparison with the processing of an unprimed
stimulus.
In order to tackle the diverse paradigms and the incompara-
bility of the theories,we designed a computational framework for
perception-based action selection in the NP paradigm by means
of physiologically justiﬁed building blocks, each showing biolog-
ically plausible dynamics. The general architecture is a dynami-
cal implementation and generalization of the model studied in
Hommel (2004). The simple thresholding mechanism responsi-
ble for the creation of perception-action bindings in Hommel’s
model is generalized using dynamic and weighted bindings. The
obtained implementation inherits freedom of interpretation from
the underlying theory.Additionally,the implementation adds fur-
ther degrees of freedom by the introduction of a number of
technically implied parameters. The beneﬁts of an implementa-
tion are,nevertheless,obvious. The computational model reduces
the risk of misinterpretation if the source code is available to
other research groups for an independent reproduction of the
results.
In order to reproduce observed results, most models have to
undergo a precise ﬁtting of model parameters, which is often a
verysubjectiveprocess.Therefore,greatcarehastobetakenof the
distinction between results due to parameter ﬁts and predictions
generated by the internal dynamics of the model without further
ﬁtting. A different way to beneﬁt from a computational model is
toanalyzethestructuralresultafterﬁtting,whichcarriesaformal-
ized version of the ﬁtted data. We build a computational model
comprising most of the mechanisms suspected to play a role in
the neural processing in NP. The outcome is not only a meta-
model for NP, termed GMNP, but in itself a simpliﬁed model of
the brain as a framework for action selection based on percep-
tion. We addressed the tradeoff between biological realism and
understandability by implementing all mechanisms as separate
blocks keeping the internal dynamics simple by implementing the
exponential dynamics previously developed in Schrobsdorff et al.
(2007b).
2.5.2. Different paradigms
A common explanation for the divergent results of NP studies is
the difference of the conducted experiments. Each paradigm has
specialaspectsconcerningtrialprocessingbeginningfrompercep-
tualpathwaysuptotheresponsemodalities.Differencesinthetask
are assumed to affect the involvement of memory and inhibitory
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modulations. Thus it is important to build a GMNP that is ﬂex-
ible enough to evaluate a variety of paradigms, i.e., not only to
computationally reproduce interesting priming experiments, but
also to quantify the difference of paradigms. Such a formulation
contributes directly to the clariﬁcation of the debate about the
inﬂuences of experimental design on NP. Most importantly, the
modelhastoacceptdifferentstimuliandtoproducedistinctforms
of responses.Inaddition,amechanismformalizingtheactualtask
for a paradigm is necessary.
A computational implementation (Houghton and Tipper,
1994) of an artiﬁcial neural network qualitatively explains NP
by an inhibitory rebound naturally emerging from the network
connections between excitatory and inhibitory cells homeostati-
cally balancing the state of a so-called property unit. Perception is
assumed to be split into the detection of single features which are
bound into object representations by hardwired connections. The
model has a very general connection scheme to be able to describe
selective attention in a variety of situations.
This connectionist implementation of distractor inhibition
theory is designed to deal with diverse perceptual inputs. Stim-
uli are decomposed into their features and recognized by spe-
cialized feature units. Then the object identity is realized by a
ﬂexiblefeaturebindingmechanism(Treisman,1996).TheGMNP
implements a binding mechanism for feature representations by
means of persistent spiking activity (Schrobsdorff et al., 2007a)
that is similar to the abstraction of population activity in a neural
network leading to the exponential dynamics (Section 2.7.1). Dif-
ferent response modalities are included in two separate layers for
semantic representations and response actions. Between the two
layers, a central executive implements a mapping to account for
different tasks (e.g., comparison). The central executive also pro-
videsinformationaboutwhichfeatureinstancecodesforthetarget
and distractor, and which feature dimension is relevant for the
response (see Section 2.6.5). Before presenting a formal version of
the GMNP (Section 2.7) we will specify the model components
based on the discussion above.
2.6. MODEL COMPONENTS
TheGMNPisformulatedinadistributedwayinwhichseveralspe-
cialized layers interact according to the ﬂow of information in the
brainduringperception-basedactionselectiontasks.Anoverview
of themodelstructureisshowninFigure3.Informationismostly
fed from top (perceptual input) to bottom (action execution),
except modulating layers like the binding layer, episodic mem-
ory, and the central executive. Perceptual input is fed into various
feature layers, each representing a certain aspect of the presented
stimuli. The object entity is represented in a feature binding layer
which forms a link between all features of one object. Depending
on the task,the model implements a mapping of relevant features
intoasemanticlayer,whichisequippedwithadecisionmechanism
to sort out the semantic representation relevant for an accurate
response to the task. The winning information is passed to the
action layer, which chooses between different possible responses
on the basis of the available information. Aside from the above
pathway, is a memory layer which stores the network state from
former episodes and feeds this information back when helpful for
a quick response.
2.6.1. Feature layers and feature binding
In the visual pathway the information from the retina is decom-
posed into low-level features which are represented by different
subsets of neurons (Van Essen et al., 1992). Later, the low-level
representations are recombined to form higher-order features of
objects from visual input (Prinzmetal, 1995). Feature decompo-
sition entails the disadvantage that the distributed information
about an object needs to be bound together for the recognition of
objects as entities,a concept known as feature binding (Treisman,
1996). The neural implementation of such bindings is still under
discussion (Hommel, 2004) but synchronization is likely to play
a role (Singer, 1995). In the GMNP, we implement this mecha-
nism in terms of a feature binding model on the basis of localized
excitationsinaspikingneuralnetwork(Schrobsdorffetal.,2007a).
In order to cover the paradigms featuring visual stimuli, we
equip the current implementation of the GMNP with feature lay-
ers to detect color, shape, location, and word(-shape). A visual
stimulus is recognized by particular activation in each of the cor-
responding feature layers and a binding between them. Binding
of the features of a certain object is realized as a set of features,
and a binding strength which speciﬁes both the importance of the
object to working memory and also the effectiveness of activation
exchange between the features of the corresponding object. The
GMNP is able to keep a small number of such bindings active at a
time.
In the formation of binding, attention seems to form a crucial
role, as neuromodulators associated with attention are essential
for the formation but not for the maintenance of bindings (Botly
andDeRosa,2007).Intermsof theGMNPthismeansthatobjects
from currently perceived stimuli are bound, and the binding can
survive the vanishing of the perceptual input. Bindings are sta-
ble against stimulus changes up to the point where the limited
resources are in use, i.e., the maximum number of bindings is
reached.
2.6.2. Semantic representations
Some NP paradigms require stimulus evaluation on a seman-
tic level, e.g., the word-picture comparison task: the specialized
Stroop cards which are the origin of NP research (Dalrymple-
Alford and Budayr, 1966); or the naming of pictograms in the
experimental paradigm introduced in Section 2.3. Semantic rep-
resentations are closely related to language processing (Demb
et al., 1995), which is distributed over the entire cortex. Despite
the distributed nature of semantic processing (Bookheimer,2002;
Devlinetal.,2002),theGMNPincludesonlyonelayerholdingthe
strengths of the semantic representation of a given stimulus (sim-
ilar to the description in Schrobsdorff et al., 2007b). The GMNP
also inherits the attention mechanism, i.e., an adaptive threshold
relyingonactivationsinthesemanticlayer.Thethresholdcontrols
information propagation to the response layer.
2.6.3. Episodic memory
Episodic-retrievaltheory,assumesthatpreviouslyprocessedstim-
uli are stored in episodic memory. In most NP paradigms, the
memorizedsequenceof trialsisassumednottoextendbeyondthe
directly preceding trial. The interference of memory with behav-
ior is assumed to depend only on the time elapsed and the stimuli
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encountered in the meantime. We prefer naming the memory
processes relevant in NP as episodic memory.
Physiologically, memory encoding is related to activity in the
left prefrontal cortex, whereas retrieval is more associated with
right prefrontal cortex (Tulving et al., 1994; Fletcher et al., 1997).
This is conjectured to be due to different control mechanisms on
the two tasks (Craik, 2002). We solve the stability-plasticity prob-
lem that memories have to be formed reliably and instantly but
have to persist for some time even in the presence of interfer-
ing input (Norman et al., 2005; Suzuki, 2006), by implementing a
limited number of memory slots that hold the entire state of the
system at a certain point in time. Such a memory is assigned a
strength which decays with time. Individual instances are the only
formsof experiencethatarerepresentedneurologically,as(Logan,
1988) postulates.
2.6.4. Memory retrieval
Memory research distinguishes between involuntary retrieval and
voluntary recollection (Yonelinas,2002). The so-called familiarity
signal is physiologically measurable, and becomes visible in the
EEG 300ms after stimulus onset. Familiarity is assumed to trigger
furtherretrieval,asaspontaneousrecognitioncanleadtorecollec-
tion (Zimmer et al.,2006; Ecker et al.,2007). Context monitoring
meanstheevaluationof theappropriatenessof aretrievedepisode
(EgnerandHirsch,2005).Topography,latency,andpolarityof the
familiarity signal in EEG-data bears resemblance to the old/new
effectrelatedtoepisodicmemoryretrieval(RuggandNagy,1989).
The two approaches, episodic retrieval and temporal dis-
crimination theory, predict differing mechanisms controlling the
strength of memory retrieval. The ﬁrst theory assumes that invol-
untary retrieval is positively correlated with perceptual similarity
of the two trials. The latter postulates another perception-based
classiﬁcation of the encountered episode as old or new. When sig-
niﬁcant evidence for an old stimulus display is accumulated, full
retrieval is triggered, while simultaneously suppressing the direct
response generation.
TheGMNPperformsthecomputationofafamiliaritysignalby
comparing the current percept with the memorized one. Depend-
ing on model parameters emphasizing either episodic-retrieval
theory or temporal discrimination, this familiarity can inﬂuence
further processing in two ways. First, the strength of retrieval
can be determined directly, i.e., familiar stimuli cause stronger
retrieval-related activity, while unfamiliar stimuli still produce a
positiveactivity.Secondly,thesystemholdsatemplatetimecourse
of afamiliaritysignalseparatingthetimecoursesof thefamiliarity
signalwhileencounteringaperfectmatchof stimulusdisplaysand
a pair of subsequent displays that vary in a single feature. Greater
familiarity indicates an identical stimulus conﬁguration, while
lowerfamiliarityisconsideredasbeingproducedbyanewdisplay.
The uncertainty of the signal early in the trial is implemented by
the GMNP by a shrinking margin around a template familiarity
curve for a nearly identical stimulus, in which the evidence of the
display being old or new is not yet signiﬁcant.
2.6.5. Central executive
The GMNP aims at a compromise of evidence-based complexity
and computational simplicity. Instead of providing mechanisms
for the adaptation to different paradigms, we rather map the
paradigms to appropriate parameter conﬁgurations. The corre-
sponding component of the GMNP is called the central executive
(Cowan,1988)andisunderstoodasanemergentpropertyofinter-
acting subsystems (Barnard, 1985; Teasdale and Barnard, 1993;
Bressler and Kelso, 2001). Even if there is no consensus on the
necessity of a central executive in memory functions (Baddeley,
1998;Johnson,2007),we will use the term in order to describe the
sudden change in system behavior if it is presented a new task. In
this way the GMNP receives information about the task demands,
i.e.,aboutaspeciﬁcparadigm,includingthetop-downinputmod-
ulatingtargetordistractoractivationandmappingsdescribingthe
determination of the input to the action layer.
2.6.6. Representing theories of negative priming
The comparison of the different theoretical approaches is one of
the major reasons for the design of the GMNP. In order to be able
to directly compare the respective impact of each mechanism,the
main components of each theory need to be precisely formulated
within a common language. In the following,we outline how each
of the theoretical approaches is realized in the GMNP.
Distractor inhibition theory is expressed in a straightforward
way.Thedistractorobject,i.e.,thefeaturethatspeciﬁesthedistrac-
tor, is subject to inhibition. Simultaneously, dynamic activations
below baseline are included to model the inhibitory rebound (this
constitutes a deviation from the model developed in Schrobsdorff
et al.,2007b). Correspondingly,inhibition in the semantic layer is
indirectly achieved via the binding between feature and semantic
layers.
Episodic-retrievaltheoryrequiresexplicitmodelingofmemory
and retrieval processes. Therefore, we included short-term mem-
ory by adding a dedicated layer that is able to store a snapshot
of the state of the dynamic system and that is subject to decay
over time. This memory layer is also capable of computing the
strength of retrieval determined by the similarity of the current
percept and the memory content. Retrieval is modeled by par-
tially restoring former system variables. Memory is updated at the
mostprominentpointinatrial,i.e.,whenthedecisiontakesplace.
Response retrieval manifests itself in the GMNP as a simpliﬁca-
tion of episodic retrieval. Only the system variables of the action
layer are restored during retrieval. The retrieval strength is still
determined by the similarity of current and stored percept.
Temporal discrimination theory acts on the same episodic
memorylayerasepisodicretrieval.Theprobabilitythatastimulus
displaywasjustpresentedcanbecomputedbylookingatthesimi-
laritybetweencurrentandmemorizedperceptasdescribedabove.
This value is highest when both conﬁgurations match exactly. The
similarity slowly rises from zero to its ﬁnal value. The current
similarity is compared to a prototype similarity signal in order to
determine whether the current percept is old or new. In order to
be robust against initial ﬂuctuations in the similarity stemming
from residual activation of the last trial, the computed difference
has to surpass a threshold that is large at trial onset but shrinks
with time. If a display is rather similar to the memorized one,
the similarity value will stay within the uncertainty interval the
longest, preventing an old–new-classiﬁcation. When the classiﬁ-
cation is accomplished, temporal discrimination theory assumes
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the information ﬂow to be affected: in the presence of new stim-
uli, retrieval is blocked, and direct computation is facilitated. For
old stimuli the direct computation is dropped and retrieval will
be performed. This is included in the GMNP in terms of a mod-
ulation of the transmission strengths between the corresponding
layers: from semantic to action for direct computation and from
episodic memory to action layer for retrieval.
The spirit of the dual mechanism hypothesis is inherent to the
GMNP, because it accounts for all theories at once. By tuning the
model parameters, the behavior predicted by each theory can be
generated. According to the above discussion it is evident that the
mechanisms postulated by inhibition and threshold theory are
located in the more sensory part of the system whereas retrieval,
even though affecting the entire system,only becomes apparent in
laterparts,i.e.,inthesemanticandactionlayer.Asthetwomecha-
nisms are implemented at distinct parts of the GMNP,coexistence
of the mechanisms is achieved trivially.
2.7. MODEL DYNAMICS
AftertheexaminationoftheprocessesinvolvedinanNPtaskinthe
previous section,we will now mathematically describe the model.
The level of description results from a compromise between the
explicitness of the formulas and the complexity of the full system.
The basic architecture of the model is simple. Perceptual input
enters the system in the feature layers, which passes information
to the semantic and action layer. Finally,we describe the behavior
of the memory variables.
Activations of feature and object representations follow an
exponentialﬁxed-pointdynamics(Schrobsdorff etal.,2007b),i.e.,
thedifferenceofastatevariableandagivenﬁxed-pointdetermines
the change of that variable while the rate of change is governed
by a time constant. This dynamics can be derived from ﬁring rate
considerations of a network of spiking neurons,as we show in the
following section.
Themodelhasanumberofmeta-parametersthatactasweights
or “setscrews” (see Section 3.1). In this way the model represents
the particular assumptions in each of the theories in Section 2.4.
We will not consider a graded likelihood of the assumptions and
therefore choose the weights to be either 1 or 0. In this way the
GMNP yields quantitative comparisons between the theoretical
accounts while continuous weights would result in new theories.
2.7.1. Determining a simple intrinsic dynamics
FortheGMNP,wewillsubsumethementalrepresentationof each
cognitive object, e.g., a perceived feature or a semantic category,
underasinglevariablewhichcorrespondsneurophysiologicallyto
the activation level in an assembly of neurons. The ﬁring behavior
of this assembly is driven by external excitatory input which, for
simplicity, is assumed to be constant while the sensory object is
present.
We consider a cluster of all-to-all coupled integrate and ﬁre
neurons. We average the ﬁring rate of the network over many
input presentations and analyze the shape of rise and decay of the
overall ﬁring rate. In each time step,the membrane potential hi of
neuroni D1,:::,N receivesadditiveexternalinputIi(t)andexci-
tation via recurrent connections with synaptic strength wi,j every
time neuron j spikes, i.e.,n
j
sp, see equation (1).
hi,nC1 D hi,n C Ii,n C
N X
jD1
wi,j

n   n
j
sp

(1)
where (x)D0 for x 6D0 and (0)D1. For continuous-time sys-
tems the time step becomes inﬁnitesimally small and changes are
expressed by a derivative dhi/dt. The dynamics can be described
by a differential equation (2).
dhi
dt
D Ii .t/ C
N X
jD1
wi,j

t   t
j
sp

(2)
If hi reaches the ﬁring threshold  D1, it delivers a spike
to its postsynaptic neurons and is reset by the threshold value
h
post-spike
i D h
pre-spike
i   . The external input Ii(t) is drawn inde-
pendently in each time step from a Gaussian distribution with a
mean chosen such that a single neuron receives on average input
equal to the difference of threshold and resting potential   h0.
Without the recurrent coupling, a neuron would thus on average
ﬁre once during stimulus presentation.
We simulated a network of N D1000 neurons. A stimulus was
shown for 1s, and the inter-stimulus interval was 1s (we are using
50 time steps per second). The total output of a neuron, i.e., the
sumofalloutgoingweights,wasﬁxedto D
PN
iD1 wi,j D 0.87 8j.
Thestochasticityof theinputandthesensitivityof thenetworkfor
ﬂuctuations result in rather random single trial ﬁring. However,
on average a coherent behavior emerges. For the results shown in
Figure4,we averaged 10,000 trials to obtain a good estimation of
the ﬁring rate over time.
In order to derive a computationally simple dynamics for the
representation variables of the GMNP, we are interested in the
shape of the time course of rise and decay of the ﬁring rate. A
good candidate to describe the observed dynamics seems to be a
set of coupled non-linear Langevin equations (Risken, 1996) of
the basic form equation (3).
dx
dt
D h .x,t/ C g .x,t/0 .t/ (3)
The state of the system is x, t is time, h is a function that
describes drift forces that depend on the actual state and time and
0(t) is a Gaussian diffusion term with zero mean h0(t)it D0 and
no correlation h0(t)0(t0)it D2(t  t0).
Since theories of NP do not make any statements about noise
inﬂuences, our strategy of aiming at a minimal model also sug-
gests that we exclude noise effects in the model. The result is an
exponential ﬁxed-point dynamics with time constant .
xnC1 D xn C   .I   xn/ (4)
dx
dt
D   .I   x/ (5)
In Figure 4 we show the averaged ﬁring rate f and plot the rel-
ative change (fnC1  fn)/fn between two time steps in reference to
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FIGURE 4 | Normalized average ﬁring rate of the network as a response
to input (applied from time step 0 to 50 indicated by the gray shaded
region) and no input (blue).The ﬁring rate is determined by binning the
spikes in each time step. Normalization is performed by division by the
average maximum ﬁring rate at time 50.The fraction of two subsequent ﬁring
rates, which corresponds to the time constant in an exponential ﬁxed-point
dynamics, is shown in red. Black lines show the means of the respective red
lines.The deviation of the blue curve from a purely exponential dynamics is
apparent, but quite small, justifying the simpliﬁed dynamics as described in
the text.
the actual ﬁxed-point,i.e.,maximum ﬁring rate 1 in case of input
or0intheabsenceof input.Theobservedtimeconstantsaresufﬁ-
ciently constant to justify the simpliﬁed dynamics of equation (4)
we used for the implementation of the GMNP.
The small periodicity of the rise time constant,even after aver-
aging over a large number of runs, can be explained by the model
structure. Figure 5 shows the distribution of membrane poten-
tials averaged over 10,000 trials as shown in Figure 4. During
input,allneuronsareshiftedintheirmembranepotentialsuchthat
smallpotentialsbecomeimprobable,tothebeneﬁtofsuperthresh-
old potentials. Most potential bins have a relative frequency of
0.0098 and 0.0115, which is near a uniform distribution. How-
ever, there is some structure that survives the averaging process.
In the beginning, all units receive only external input. They are
shifted upwards, leaving a gap which propagates through the
entire range of potentials. Neurons that spiked are not reset to
zero but lowered in their normalized potential by 1. Since they
additionally receive recurrent as well as external input, virtually
no neurons have membrane potentials between 0 and 0.15. As
recurrent input tends toward a ﬁxed-point, there is a trend of
jumping into the band between 0.18 and 0.28 after spiking. This
band is now shifted upwards by the same amount of activation.
In every time step, a neuron jumps from one band to the next
one. After the offset of input only decaying recurrent excitation is
present.
2.7.2. Feature variables
IntheGMNP,allobjectsfrominputspacearerepresentedbytuples
of feature activations. The number of relevant features can vary
according to the paradigm. Information about a perceived object
 is decomposed into its constituent features and then passed
to the appropriate layers of the GMNP. Perceptual features drive
feature detection variables of the system, whereas the informa-
tion about the combination of all features to one object entity is
governed by the binding layer. This deﬁnes the dynamic synaptic
interaction between the feature variables of the object.
Feature variables f
j
i represent whether a feature i, e.g., color,
shape, or word shape, has the value j, e.g., green, etc. True infor-
mation enters the system by the corresponding external input F
j
i.
The dynamics of a feature variable is determined by several dri-
ving forces that act simultaneously,see equation (6). The ﬁrst one
is an exponential drift toward F
j
i. The time constant f of the drift
equals either f if the feature variable is lower than the input and
rises by an active drive, or f if the input variable is lower than
the current activation and the feature variable passively decays. F
j
i
is deﬁned by constant unit input O F in the presence of the respec-
tive feature in the display conﬁguration. If the particular feature
instance deﬁnes the object to be target or distractor,an additional
input, excitatory or inhibitory, respectively, is applied to the cor-
responding feature variable. In case of feature perception, F
j
i is
set to a generic input strength O F plus the current value of the
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FIGURE 5 | Distribution of membrane potentials averaged over 10,000
trials. Note that the potentials are mostly uniformly distributed, as the color
map only covers values from 0.0098 to 0.0115. Nevertheless, the ﬁne grained
plot reveals the processes generating the ﬁring rates analyzed in Figure 4:
initially all neurons are pushed toward higher membrane potential by the
input, leaving a relative gap that is propagated upwards.Then, assemblies of
neurons that are characterized by increased membrane potentials form when
the recurrent input builds up. Finally, the system relaxes and the less regular
spikes rebuild a more equally distributed picture until no further spikes are
generated.
variable accounting for the reception of input by only a subset
of neurons in one assembly, similar to residual activations intro-
duced in Schrobsdorff et al. (2007b). The residual overshoot of
the input decays to the maximum input in the same way that
would feature activation. In the case of feature absence, the input
is set to the activation baseline value of L F, which is not necessarily
zero.
F
j
i D
8
> <
> :
O F C f
j
i at display onset, if instance j of feature i is present
f

O F   F
j
i

during stimulus perception, as long as F
j
i > O F
L F at display offset
(6)
Both target selection mechanisms, target ampliﬁcation and
distractor inhibition add to the corresponding feature input F
j
i
resulting in the overall input F
j
i, see equation (7). Target ampliﬁ-
cation A is linearly increasing until a response is given and set to
zero afterward, see equation (8). Distractor inhibition I is said to
persist for some time, as it has to be retrenched after a response
was given. Therefore, inhibition I increases linearly with slope k
during perception and fades linearly after the decision was made,
see equation (9).
F
j
i D
8
> <
> :
F
j
i C A if

i,j
	
deﬁnes the target
F
j
i C I if

i,j
	
deﬁnes the distractor
F
j
i otherwise
(7)
dA
dt
D  during stimulus presentation (8)
A D 0 no stimulus present
dI
dt
D

k during external input
 k after the offset of input until I D 0 (9)
The second term governing the dynamics of features is the
loss of feature speciﬁcity in the absence of input deﬁned by a
broadening of activation with time constant , within one fea-
ture toward the feature mean hf
j
i ii, without lowering the total
activationof therespectivefeaturelayer.Additionally,featureacti-
vationispassedviaexistingbindingstotheotherfeatureinstances
belonging to the same object. If, e.g., the feature tuple {color,
green}{shape,ball}{location,bottom} deﬁning a green ball shown
at the bottom of the visual scene is held by the binding variable
b{color, green}{shape, ball}{location, bottom}, its value deﬁnes the amount
of activation interchange between the variables f
green
color , f ball
shape, and
f bottom
location such that they all approach the object mean. There exists
only one feature variable for green. Therefore multiple green
objectsexperienceanaturalconnection,astheysharethisvariable.
The last term that drives feature variables is the back projection
of memorized episodes into the feature layer. Weighted by the
matching value rk of the actual percept and the kth last memo-
rized episode and the strength ek of the respective memory trace,
thevalueof thefeaturevariableattherespectiveresponsemoment
e
f
j
i
k is fed back to the variable.
In total, the change of feature activation f
j
i is the sum of four
exponential drifts, given in equation (10). First, an adaptation
toward input strength F
j
i with time constant f. Second, an adap-
tation toward the mean of all activations in the particular feature
layer hf
j
i ii with time constant . Third, an adaptation toward the
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mean of the other features of each object  the current feature
belongstowithtimeconstantb,i.e.,thecurrentbindingstrength
of that object.And ﬁnally,fourth,an adaptation toward the mem-
orized value of the current variable e
f
j
i
k with time constant rkek,
i.e., the product of the retrieval strength, the match between the
percept and the kth memorized episode,and the current memory
strength.
df
j
i
dt
D f

F
j
i   f
j
i

C 

hf
j
i ii   f
j
i

C
X
 2 f
j
i
b

hf m
l i
f m
l 2nf
j
i
 f
j
i

C
X
k
rkek

e
f
j
i
k  f
j
i

(10)
where
f D
(
f if F
j
i > f
j
i
f if F
j
i < f
j
i
2.7.3. Feature binding mechanism
Thebindingsaredynamicvariablesthemselvesthatencodefeature
combinations within an object. Because the underlying structure
(Schrobsdorff et al., 2007a) is a ﬂexible but resource-constrained
layer, the number of such binding variables is limited. When an
object appears in stimulus space the feedback activation from the
binding layer indicates whether the current object is already rep-
resented. This would correspond to an immediate recognition of
the identity of the object. If the object is not yet represented, the
weakest binding variable that is not subject to current input is
overwritten,deleting the respective object from working memory.
If anobjectisshown,therespectivebindingvariableisdrivenwith
time constant b toward a maximum strength O b. If the percept of
an object is gone, the respective binding variable passively decays
with time constant b to zero, see equation (11).
dbfik,jkgk
dt
D
8
> <
> :
b

O b   bfik,jkgk

if an object with the respective
feature combination is perceived
 bbfik,jkgk if the percept is switched off
(11)
Ifthebindingslotisoverwritten,wehaveb{ik, jk}k D0,i.e.,object
{ik, jk}k is not shown and is held by the weakest binding when a
new display is uncovered containing a non-bound object {il, jl}l.
2.7.4. Short-term modulation of connectivity
The GMNP directs the information ﬂow such that it achieves a
decision whether a response will be computed anew from the
perceptual input or will be retrieved from episodic memory. For
this purpose, synaptic connections between the layers are either
blocked or facilitated, depending on the old-new signal ok that is
generatedbycomparingthekthlastepisodetothecurrentpercept.
Ablockingvariableblock approachesok withtimeconstantblock,
seeequation(13).Thelimitingvalueissetto1,1/2,or0depending
on whether the signal is old,unclassiﬁed or new,respectively. This
isappliedif themodelbehavioristunedtorepresentthetemporal
discriminationtheory.Thesynapticstrengthisscaledaccordingto
block betweenaminimumsynapticstrength L f !s andanentirely
open channel of f!s D1, see equation (12).
f !s D
 
1   L f !s

C L f !sblock (12)
with
dblock
dt
D block .ok   block/ (13)
2.7.5. Semantic variables
The role of the variables in the semantic layer is assigned by
the central executive, depending on task demands. Therefore, a
ﬁxed description of the dynamics of semantic variables is not
possible. We assume that after a hypothetical training phase that
introduces a new task, the central executive has produced a rea-
sonable gating function S(f) of feature activations to the semantic
layer. In the case of a naming paradigm this mapping can be
as simple as the identity map from object shapes to semantic
object category. The function S(f) determines the ﬁxed-point,
which the semantic activation approaches at a rate s or s, for
an actively driven rise or a passive decay, respectively, see equa-
tion (15). Again the variables are subject to retrieval of former
episodes analogous to feature variables. Additionally, the infor-
mation ﬂow is modulated by the connection factor f!s, see
equation (14).
dsj
dt
D f !ss

Sj  
f

  sj

C
X
k
rkek

esj
k   sj

(14)
where
s D

s if Sj > sj
s if Sj < sj (15)
Actions of the GMNP are based on the most prominent acti-
vation of the semantic layer. We chose an adaptive-threshold
mechanism to single out the highest activation. Only activations
surpassingthethresholds areeligibletobepassedontotheaction
layer.
2.7.6. The adaptive-threshold in the semantic layer
As a decision mechanism for comparison tasks,the semantic layer
is equipped with an adaptive-threshold s. The threshold variable
itself obeys an exponential ﬁxed-point dynamics on the basis of
a scaled average of activation in the semantic layer. This is done
similarly to the threshold behavior in Schrobsdorff et al. (2007b).
The scaling of the average s is dependent on the paradigm and
should be set such that the ﬁxed-point of the threshold is between
the highest two semantic activations. As a consequence, the base-
line activation L F which is considered a virtual zero in the process
has to be accounted for by only considering the difference to L F,
see equation (16).
1
s
ds
dt
D s
X
j

sj   L F

 

s   L F

(16)
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2.7.7. Action representations
The action layer behaves similarly as the semantic layer, see equa-
tion(17).Actionactivationvariablesaredriventowardanexternal
input A(s, f) that is computed from semantic and feature repre-
sentations according to the task,i.e.,given by a mapping function
from the central executive. Depending on whether the adapta-
tion is an actively driven rise or a passive decay, two respective
time constants a, a apply. An aspect that is easily overseen is
the option not to respond, for example in cases where no target
object is shown. This is represented by the formal action a0. Aj(s,
f,f,s!a)isdesignedsuchthatwheneverthereisnotargetstimulus
shown,e.g.,between two trials,A0(s,f,f,s!a) equals 1. In case of
stimuli triggering a responseA0(s,f,f,s!a) equals 0. The variable
f,s!a is the current synaptic strength between both feature and
semantic layer toward the action layer.
daj
dt
D a

Aj  
s,f ,f ,s!a

  aj

C ra
X
k
rkek

eaj
k   aj

(17)
where
a D

a if Aj  
s,f

> aj
a if Aj  
s,f

< aj
The relative retrieval of action representations ra is modulated
contrary to the synaptic transmission to the action layer f,s!a
reﬂecting the facilitation of action retrieval by an old-c an old
episode which can be answered by retrieving a former response.
Also,themodulationofinformationﬂowcandecreasetheretrieval
of a response if a new episode is classiﬁed, see equation (18).
ra D
 
1Cmax
 
L f ,s!a, L f !s

 2max
 
L f ,s!a, L f !s

block
(18)
where
f ,s!a D
 
1   L f ,s!a

C L f ,s!ablock
In order to model the decision making process in the action
layerwhereasingleactionhastobechosenforexecution,weintro-
duceathresholdlevelanalogoustothesemanticlayerdescribedin
Section2.7.6,seeequation(19).Asinputtotheactionlayerranges
from 0 to 1,we do not have to care about baseline activation here.
1
a
da
dt
D a
X
j
aj   a (19)
Suprathreshold activations aj >a deﬁne the space of possi-
ble actions the system can take. If there is only one action that is
suprathreshold, the corresponding action is executed. In case of
a0 >a, the system does not do anything.
2.7.8. Memory processes
Memory processes are modeled in a simple way. At points in time
thatmarktheclosureof anepisode,inthepresentparadigmwhen
an action has been performed, the entire state of the model is
written down as one episode. The stored values are used to com-
pute similarities between past episodes and a current percept, the
retrieval strength rk. This similarity signal triggers an automatic
retrieval of the former episodes. The greater the similarity, the
strongerthememorizedvaluesdrivetherespectivevariables.Addi-
tionally, to account for memory decay with time, the presence of
memorized episodes is set to a certain initial value O e when the
episode is written down, and then freely decays to zero with time
constant e, see equation (20).
ek D O e if episode k is memorized
dek
dt D  eek otherwise
(20)
If a new episode is memorized, the kth last episode becomes
the (k C1)th last one, see equation (21).
ev
kC1 D ev
k
ev
1 D v 2 { f
j
i ,b{ jk,ik} k,sj,aj}
)
when an action is taken (21)
To account for the classiﬁcation, postulated, e.g., in temporal
discrimination theory, we need a reliable old-new signal which is
rather hard to get from only internal values, i.e., information that
is accessible by the system itself. The current percept can only be
assessed through the extracted feature. The intention is to have
a value that is higher for a higher degree of similarity between
the current percept and a memorized one. In other words, the
difference of a current feature or binding value and the corre-
sponding memory trace should be minimal, e.g. .f
j
i   e
f
j
i
k /. This
is best achieved by the inverse of the sum of all differences. Still,
there is a normalization problem,due to the varying stimulus dis-
plays. As the system is trained for the present task, it has some
knowledge about the expected number of objects n in the display.
However,thecurrentobjectscanonlybeguessedbylookingatthe
n strongest bindings. Therefore, we apply a normalization by the
signiﬁcance of a percept given by the sum over all currently per-
ceivedfeaturevariables,dividedbythenumberoffeaturesrelevant
to the task, see equation (22).
rk D
P
i,j
f
j
i
#f
0
@
X
{il,jl} l


 f
j
i   e
f
j
i
k


  C
1
O b


 b{il,jl} l   e
b{il,jl} l
k


 

1
A
 1
(22)
where {ij, jl}l denotes a subjective percept, i.e., one of the objects
being held by the n strongest bindings, n being the number of
objects in one display.
2.7.9. Connectivity modulation
Information gating is modeled by the dynamic opening or closing
of synaptictransmissionsbetweenthedifferentlayersaswellasthe
retrieval channel to the action layer. This modulation is governed
by an old-new signal ok comparing the kth last episode to the cur-
rent percept. The comparison process is modeled by locating the
kth retrieval signal rk below, in between, or above a deviation u
from a prototype time course for an intermediate resemblance of
displaysgivenbyanexponentialadaptationfromaninitialvalue L d
with time constant d toward a retrieval level L d dividing old from
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new displays, see equation (23). In order to account for a greater
uncertainty after the beginning of a trial, u shrinks exponentially
with time constant u, see equation (24).
ok D
8
<
:
0 if rk > d C u
1 if rk < d   u
1
2 otherwise
(23)
du
dt
D  uu (24)
where d D L d and u D L u at display onset, d D0 and u D0 at dis-
play offset,while the stimulus is present the following dynamics is
observed, see equation (25).
dd
dt
D d

O d   d

(25)
3. RESULTS
Even though the most important aspect of the GMNP is the pos-
sibility to quantitatively compare different priming theories, the
current contribution is not intended to establish the conditions
and perform a thorough comparison, but the main result we are
presenting is a framework which is general enough to quantify
all theories of NP in a common language. Therefore, the current
section is meant as a proof of concept to demonstrate the way the
GMNP works.
3.1. DEFINING MODEL PARAMETERS
Inordertoanalyzetheconsequencesof atheory,wedeﬁneweights
4thatswitchonorofftheeffectofparticularassumptionsinathe-
ory. These weights are meta-parameters insofar as they introduce
constraints on the low-level parameters of the model that reﬂect
theimpactofaspeciﬁctheoreticalmechanismatabehaviorallevel.
Welabelthesevariablesaccordingtothecorrespondingtheory,see
Table3:4er,episodicretrieval;4rr,responseretrieval;4ib,inhibi-
tion vs. boost; 4gt,global threshold; 4fsb,feature-semantic block;
4sab, semantic action block; 4td, temporal discrimination.
Retrieval is controlled by adjusting the initial strength of a
memorytraceasitlinearlydeterminestheimpactof retrieval.The
Table 3 |Weights controlling the strength of the implementation of a
theoretical account into the GMNP .
Model behavior
for 4D0
Model behavior
for 4D1
4er No retrieval at all Maximum retrieval
4rr Only retrieval of response Total retrieval
4ib Distractor inhibition Target boost
4gt No activation interference Forced decay and activation
broadening
4fsb Full propagation Retrieval blocks features semantic
synapses
4sab Full propagation Retrieval blocks semantic action
synapses
4td Classical episodic retrieval Old/new evaluation
Their range is continuously between 0 and 1.
modulation factor 4er scales the maximum memory strength O e. If
4er is 0, no memory is written down, and therefore retrieval has
no effect on the system behavior. If 4er D1, memories are stored
initially with the maximum strength O e and retrieval provides the
input to the system described in Section 2.7.8.
Thequestionwhethertheentiresystemstateisretrievedoronly
the prime response, separates episodic retrieval from response-
retrieval theory. These two assumptions are mutually exclusive.
Therefore the weight 4rr gradually shuts down the retrieval of
activations in layers other than the action layer. If 4rr D1 the
entire episode is retrieved, whereas, if 4rr D0, only the action
layer receives memory input.
Distractor inhibition theory and the global threshold theory
conﬂict with each other by either assuming inhibition of the dis-
tractor or a target boost, respectively. The weight 4ib modulates
input to the feature instance that identiﬁes target and distractor.
If 4ib D0,only the distractor receives inhibiting input,i.e., D0.
If 4ib D1 only the target feature receives excitation, i.e., k D0.
4ib additionally adjusts the baseline activation level from 1/2 in
the distractor inhibition case to 0 with target boost, where no
sub-baseline activation is assumed.
At this point, a major gap in the retrieval accounts becomes
obvious. They do not make any statements on what the direct
computation of a trial may look like. The GMNP thus needs some
decisionmakingmechanism.Inordertohavetheleasteffectof the
decision making mechanism on priming effects in the case where
we consider retrieval based mechanisms, we chose to have a pure
targetboostinthefeaturelayers.Forceddecayaswellasactivation
broadeningasinherentfeaturesof theglobalthresholdtheorywill
thusbecontrolledindependently.4gt Linearlycontrolsthebroad-
ening of activation  and the strength of the forced decay if two
concepts compete for a feature instance.
Both temporal discrimination and episodic-retrieval theory
postulate a decision of the system as to whether the current
response should be generated directly from the input,or retrieved
from memory. The corresponding modulation in the general
model is done via the weight 4fsb. If 4fsb D0, there is a com-
petition between direct computation and retrieval in the system.
If 4fsb D1, the strength of retrieval, i.e., the similarity signal,
triggers a shutdown of the synapses between features and seman-
tic layer, modeling a decision of the system to only retrieve
the response and drop the direct determination of the right
answer.
In an excursion into episodic retrieval (Tipper and Cranston,
1985) argued in favor of blocking of the information ﬂow in the
episodic retrieval context right before the action selection state.
This manifests in the general model as a blocking similar to 4fsb
described in the last paragraph. However, the block acts between
the semantic and the action layer. The corresponding weight is
4sab.
A ﬁnal weight is given by 4td which controls the evaluation
of a stimulus being old or new before retrieval is initiated. In
the case 4td D0, the similarity signal determines the retrieval
strength from the beginning of a trial, whereas if 4td D1 there
is no retrieval unless the similarity signal surmounts the uncer-
tainty region around the prototype similarity signal, as explained
in Section 2.7.8.
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Table4 summarizes the values of the weights if the impact of a
singletheoreticalaccountistobeevaluated.Notethatsomemech-
anisms are inherent to the GMNP such as activation propagation
Table 4 |Weight settings required by various theories.
4er 4rr 4ib 4gt 4fsb 4sab 4td
Distractor inhibition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Global threshold 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Episodic retrieval 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Response retrieval 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Temporal discrimination 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
via the feature bindings. Therefore, these settings do not give a
minimalcomputationalmodelof therespectivetheory.Rather,we
keep the unspeciﬁed mechanisms constant across all simulations.
3.2. VOICEKEY PARADIGM
The following section will show an example of the GMNP in a
voicekey paradigm, see Section 2.2. To show the internal dynam-
ics of the GMNP, all relevant variables are plotted over nine trials
including all ﬁve conditions in Figure 6. The weights are tuned
to episodic retrieval, i.e., there are no activation interferences in
the feature layers. In response to the perceptual input, the target
color green is boosted and activation exchanged via the bindings.
In addition, activation is retrieved from memory.
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FIGURE 6 |Activation traces over time in the different layers of the
GMNP in the voicekey paradigm described in Section 2.2. Different colors
correspond to different variables in the respective layer. A few traces are to be
highlighted: solid blue lines in both the semantic and the action layer
correspond to the respective threshold variable, black in the episodic memory
layer denotes the strength of the memory trace, yellow is the uncertainty
region for the old-new signal which is drawn in orange.The model is in
classical episodic-retrieval mode, see Section 3.1.Targets are boosted and the
entire episode retrieved. Retrieval is apparent in the plots by the re-rise of
formerly active variables.
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The presentation of a red and a green pictogram drives the two
color and the two shape representations in the respective layers.
Thecentralexecutivedeliversadditionalinputtogreenwhichaug-
mentstheactivityof thetargetobject’sshapeviathebindings.The
semantic representations are fed by a one-to-one mapping from
the shape layer, i.e., S.f / D I. The plot of the episodic memory
layer shows the memory strength in black which decays with time
fromaﬁxedvalueatmemoryinitializationwhichtakesplaceatthe
point a response is given. In orange, the plot shows the similarity
signal which linearly modulates the retrieval of a former trial. The
signal is highest for the TT trial,intermediate for DT,TD,and DD
in ascending order. In the action layer, the black dotted trace is
for the no-action response, see Section 2.7.7. The selection of the
targetinthesemanticlayer,i.e.,theobjectsurpassingthesemantic
threshold, is fed forward to the action layer.
The present simulation was run with the following values
of the relevant parameters: 4er D1, 4rr D1, 4ib D1, 4gt D0,
4fsb D0, 4sab D0, 4td D0,  D0.0005, L F D1, trecognition D50,
tafterimage D30,tmotor D80,f D0.01,f D0.003, O b D 0.05,#b D7,
b D0.008, b D0.005, s D 0.002, s D 0.51, a D0.004,
a D0.002,a D 0.002, a D 0.5, O e D 0.002, e D0.003.
Negative priming in DT trials and positive priming in TT trials
are with 24 and 53ms at rather realistic scales (see Table 5). The
present example together with three other realizations is part of
the GMNP-software bundle.
3.3. ANALYSIS OF THE WORD-PICTURE PARADIGM
As a showcase example of how to exploit the capabilities of the
GMNP to gain more insight in the interaction of the different
processesthatareinvolvedinNP,wenowpresentadetailedanaly-
sisof theGMNPwhenfacedwithaword-picturecomparisontask
asitisdescribedinIhrkeetal.(2011).Thisparticularparadigmhas
asecondfactorbesidesprimingcondition,whichisresponserepe-
tition. Therefore,the labels of the experimental conditions receive
an additional sufﬁx, i.e., s for response switch and r for response
repetition. By a parallel implementation, we are able to perform
a gradient descent on the parameter set, while keeping the theory
semaphores adjusted to each of the settings described in Table 4.
Thereby, we obtain information about which of the theoretical
assumptions implemented in the GMNP is able to reproduce the
experimental results to which degree. Although we optimized the
modelfortheDTandTTconditions,weprovidetheresultsforthe
other conditions that were present in the corresponding experi-
mentaswell,whichcanberegardedasparameter-freepredictions.
Table 5 | Mean reaction time and effect strength for the priming
conditions CO, DT,TT produced by the GMNP in episodic-retrieval
mode as described in Section 3.2.
hRTi [ms] (SD) Effect [ms]
CO 976 (7) –
DT 1000 (10)  24
TT 923 (22) 53
TD 1134 (11)  73
DD 1049 (9)  158
These predictions are there to provide the reader with an idea of
how the model can inform further experimental work.
After convergence, the root mean squared error between
experimental and simulated effects and control reaction time
of the GMNP instance set to distractor inhibition behav-
ior is the lowest (see Table 6). The obtained parameters
in that case are: 4er D4rr D4ib D4gt D4fsb D4sab D4td D0,
iotaD0.000001,  D0.00155,  D0.00011,  D0.0005, L F D1,
trecognition D50,tafterimage D30,tmotor D80,f D0.009,f D0.003,
O b D 0.05, #b D7, b D0.0096, b D0.005, s D 0.002, s D
0.4131, shape!s D0.1, word!s D0.12, s!a D1, a D0.0036,
a D0.002, a D 0.002, a D 0.6, O e D 0.002, e D0.003.
Thecorrespondingreactiontimes,giveninTable7,showavery
goodreproduction.Theinteractionbetweenresponserelationand
priming condition gave rise to response-retrieval theory, as dis-
tractor inhibition theory per se is not able to explain it, although
Table 6 | Root mean squared error (RMSE) after a converged gradient
descent ﬁt to the absolute reaction time of a control trial (COs and
COr) and the priming effects of DTs, DTr, andTTs andTTr while
keeping the theory weights ﬁxed.
RMSE
Distractor inhibition 14.0
Temporal discrimination 22.5
Episodic retrieval 34.6
Response retrieval 38.1
Global threshold 39.1
Table 7 | Simulated reaction times and effects by the GMNP in
distractor inhibition mode compared to experimental results from
Ihrke et al. (2011), after ﬁtting model parameters to minimize the
RMSE in control RT and the effect sizes forTT and DT conditions.
GMNP RT [ms] Experimental RT [ms]
COs 825.5 821.2
DTs 829.8 842.0
TTs 840.4 835.8
TDs 830.5 814.9
TTs 819.8 817 .6
COr 835.5 838.4
DTr 826.3 829.5
TTr 814.3 816.7
TDr 815.4 840.7
DDr 836.2 824.4
EFFECTS
DTs  4.2  20.8
TTs  14.8  14.6
TDs  5.0 6.3
DDs 5.7 3.6
DTr 9.1 8.9
TTr 21.2 21.7
TDr 20.1  2.3
DDr  0.7 14.0
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it is remarkable that distractor inhibition, as it is implemented in
the GMNP,seems to best explain the experimental data. There are
several aspects to discuss in that context. First, the GMNP does
not reduce to the original implementation of distractor inhibition
theory with one on- and one off-cell, controlling recognition of
objects. The framework of the GMNP, i.e., its layer structure, the
featuredecomposition,andthededicatedactionlayerofferaﬂexi-
bilitythattheoriginaltheorydidnothave.Second,theinabilityof
the GMNP in distractor inhibition mode to perfectly ﬁt both DTs
and DTr simultaneously may point to the limitations of a pure
inhibitory account and toward the necessity of retrieval mecha-
nismstofullyexplaintheinteractionaspostulatedinRothermund
et al. (2005),for a graphical comparison of DTs and DTr trials see
Figure 7.
Whenencounteringapparentcontradictionstotheoriginalfor-
mulation of a theory, another great advantage of computational
modeling becomes important: it is very easy to extract detailed
information about the conditions that are responsible for unat-
tended behavior, thus providing quick and deﬁnite explanations
for it. In the described example it seems like distractor inhibition
theory is not well implemented in the GMNP as the correspond-
ing setting produces the best ﬁt for an interaction of response
relation and priming condition, one of the known weak points
of distractor inhibition as it cannot explain these results. But
when examining the behavior of the GMNP in detail, the effect
is solely present in the action layer, which has not been taken into
account by the original distractor inhibition theory. The RMSE
between DTs and DTr is less than a tenth of the difference in the
action layer when averaged over one trial. Further, this numeri-
cal experiment shows that the postulate that response repetition
interaction with priming is incompatible with distractor inhibi-
tion seems too strict. Obviously, adding a response mechanism
with slowly decaying response activation is sufﬁcient to enable a
distractor inhibition model to show such an interaction,even if it
is admittedly imperfect.
4. DISCUSSION
Combining experimental evidence from behavioral experiments
with basic system neuroscientiﬁc mechanisms, we present a
GMNPthatincorporatesallpresentlyrelevanttheoriesof thephe-
nomenon.Themodelclearlyidentiﬁesdifferencesofexperimental
conditions and is thus able to resolve existing inconsistencies
among the important theories. The model is tested in a num-
ber of standard scenarios and is shown to be easily extendable to
non-standard versions of priming experiments.
The GMNP gives a uniﬁed framework to quantify each of
the theories for NP, allowing, for the ﬁrst time, a quantitative
comparisonof theimpactof theproposedmechanisms.Theiden-
tiﬁcationof weightsforthedifferentaccountsmakesitconvenient
to compare the different predictions in a particular setting.
Negative priming presents itself as a complex phenomenon
which has been accounted for by different theoretical descriptions
focusing on speciﬁc experimental paradigms. A computational
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FIGURE 7 |Activation traces over time in the relevant layers of the GMNP
in the comparison paradigm. For coloring see Figure 6.The model is tuned
to distractor inhibition mode, see Section 3.1.Two different conditions are
shown: DTs, the former target becomes the current target and the reaction
switches (from no to yes in this case); and DTr, again the former distractor
becomes the current target but now the reaction does not switch (yes in both
prime and probe trial).This plot illustrates the difﬁculty of comparing theories
that are developed in a different context. Distractor inhibition theory itself is
not able to explain a reaction time difference between the two conditions, as
it is only formulated on a semantic level. Indeed GMNP does not show a
difference in the traces except in the action layer, where persistent activation
and relative inhibition causes the observed effects.
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theory can provide a comprehensive framework under these con-
ditions if it is both sufﬁciently abstract and ﬂexible to reveal
similarityandtodescribethedifferencesbetweentheaspectsofthe
phenomenonunderconsideration.Interestingly,theadaptationof
the computational model by means of weights (see Table 4) gives
a straightforward recipe for generating predictions. In principle
there are 27 D128 possible conﬁgurations for the values of the
weights,only ﬁve of which related to experimental and theoretical
studies investigated so far in the current literature. Obviously not
all conﬁgurations are interesting or even meaningful, but a few
more studies can be easily suggested that would provide insight
into the necessity of the model’s components while so far we can
only judge whether they are sufﬁcient.
ThesimulatedreactiontimesinSection3.2andtheotherexam-
ples featured in the provided code, show that the behavior of the
GMNP is far from being robust against even small parameter
changes. Even though a stable model is much more convenient
from a theoretical point of view, we consider this instability nec-
essary in order to account for the multitude of different ﬁndings
in connection with NP. However, we have to face the question
of whether the model is able to ﬁt any pattern of experimentally
recorded data with just the right parameter settings. Due to the
high dimensionality of the parameter space and the sensitivity of
the GMNP, this question cannot be answered conclusively by the
means of parameter scanning techniques. In fact, an important
next step for the GMNP is parameter reduction by determining as
many values as possible by comparisons with trusted experimen-
tal results, e.g., for the availability of afterimages, decay times of
feature bindings, etc. The detail of the GMNP is also easily capa-
ble of showing partial reaction times as described in Ihrke et al.
(2012) and Schrobsdorff et al. (2012). Therefore, a good way to
limit the range of the parameter space would be to have a series of
time-marker experiments specially designed to reveal processing
stages that are measurable in the GMNP. Till that time the GMNP
can only be a basis on which a concrete discussion on the nature
of NP theories and paradigms can be made.
Besides the direct computation of reaction times,the structure
of GMNP allows for numerical ﬁtting via a multitude of algo-
rithms.As an example we showed a gradient descent search for an
optimalparameterset,keepingthetheoryweightsﬁxedinorderto
compare the different theories in terms of ﬂexibility to ﬁt a given
set of experimental results.Although a pure gradient descent may
not be suitable for such a complex and huge parameter space, the
numerical experiments in Section 3.3 already showed a surpris-
ing result: expanding the distractor inhibition model by only a
reaction mechanism with a threshold and persistent activation as
well as relative inhibition,provides a context which is able to pro-
duce the interaction of response relation and priming condition,
whichisotherwiseconsideredtobetheweakestpointof distractor
inhibition theory.
Another promising extension follows from the abstract formu-
lation of relations among mechanisms that are involved in NP.
JustasNPtheoriesareformulatedusingconceptssuchasmemory
or central executive which are borrowed from other areas in psy-
chology, the computational implementation of relations among
these concepts also has a wider applicability than NP. The main
components of the GMNP qualify it already as a cognitive archi-
tecture similar, e.g., to ACT-R (Anderson et al., 1997) or SOAR
(Laird et al., 1987). Beyond this, it would be interesting to discuss
the ensuing perspectives for design of artiﬁcial cognitive systems,
such as for the control of an autonomous robot.
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